A DISCOURSE Concerning MILITIA'S AND Standing Armies.

With relation to the Paſt and Preſent Governments of *EUROPE*, AND OF *ENGLAND* in particular.

Res eſt periculi plena, ſummam Rei Publicæ hominibus Mercenariis, ſine re, ſine ſpe, quidvis ob pecuniam auſuris, committere; quorum profundam avaritiam incendat ad nova molienda occaſio, & fortuna ſecum fidem circumagat. Thuan. Hiſt.

London, Printed in the Year 1697.

1913

A DISCOURSE

Concerning

Militia's and *Standing Armies.*

THERE is not perhaps in humane Affairs any thing ſo unaccountable as the Indignity and Cruelty with which the far greater part of Mankind ſuffer themſelves to be uſed under pretence of Government. For ſome Men falſly perſwading themſelves that bad Governments are advantageous to them, as moſt conducing to gratify their Ambition, Avarice and Luxury, ſet themſelves with the utmoſt Art and Violence to procure their Eſtabliſhment: and almoſt the whole World has been trampled under foot, and ſubjected to Tyranny, for want of underſtanding by what Methods they were brought into it. For tho Mankind take great Care and Pains to inſtruct themſelves in other Arts and Sciences, yet very few apply themſelves to conſider the Nature of Government, an Enquiry ſo uſeful and neceſſary both

to Magiſtrate and People. Nay, in moſt Countries the Arts of State being altogether directed either to enſlave the People, or to keep them under Slavery, it is become almoſt every where a Crime to reaſon about Matters of Government. But if Men would beſtow a ſmall part of the Time and Application which they throw away upon curious but uſeleſs Studies, or endleſs Gaming, in peruſing thoſe excellent Rules of Government which the Antients have left us, they would be enabled to diſcover all ſuch Abuſes and Corruptions as tend to the Ruine of Publick Societies. 'Tis therefore very ſtrange that they ſhould think Study and Knowledg neceſſary in every thing they go about, except in the nobleſt and moſt uſeful of all Applications, The Art of Government.

Now if any Man in compaſſion to the Miſeries of a People ſhould endeavour to diſabuſe them in any thing relating to Government, he will certainly incur the Diſpleaſure, and perhaps be purſued by the Rage of thoſe, who think they find their Account in the Oppreſſion of the World; but will hardly ſucceed in his Endeavours to undeceive the Multitude. For the Generality of all Ranks of Men are cheated by Words and Names; and provided the antient Terms and outward Forms of any Government be retained, let the Nature of it be never ſo much altered, they continue to dream that they ſhall ſtill enjoy their former Liberty, and are not to be awakned till it prove too late. Of this there are many remarkable Examples in Hiſtory; but that particular

cular Inſtance which I have choſen to inſiſt on, as moſt ſutable to my purpoſe, is, the Alteration of Government which happened in moſt Countries of *Europe* about the Year 1500. And 'tis worth Obſervation, that tho this Change was fatal to their Liberty, yet it was not introduced by the Contrivance of ill-deſigning Men; nor were the miſchievous Conſequences perceived, unleſs by a few wiſe Men, who, if they ſaw it, wanted Power to prevent it.

Two hundred Years being already paſſed ſince this Alteration began, *Europe* has felt the Effects of it by ſad Experience; and the true Cauſes of the Change are now become more viſible.

To lay open this Matter in its full Extent, it will be neceſſary to look farther back, and examin the Original and Conſtitution of thoſe Governments that were eſtabliſhed in *Europe* about the Year 400, and continued till this Alteration.

When the Goths, Vandals, and other warlike Nations, had at different Times, and under different Leaders, over-run the Weſtern Parts of the Roman Empire, they introduced the following Form of Government into all the Nations they ſubdued. The General of the Army became King of the Conquered Country; and the Conqueſt being abſolute, he divided the Lands amongſt the Great Officers of his Army, afterwards called *Barons*; who again parcelled out their ſeveral Territories in ſmaller Portions to the inferiour Souldiers that had followed them in the Wars, and who then became their Vaſſals,

enjoying those Lands for Military Service. The King reserved to himself some Demeasnes for the Maintenance of his Court and Attendance. When this was done, there was no longer any standing Army kept on foot, but every Man went to live upon his own Lands; and when the Defence of the Country required an Army, the King summoned the Barons to his Standard, who came attended with their Vassals. Thus were the Armies of *Europe* composed for about eleven hundred Years; and this Constitution of Government put the Sword into the hands of the Subject, because the Vassals depended more immediately on the Barons, than on the King; which effectually secured the Freedom of those Governments. For the Barons could not make use of their Power to destroy those limited Monarchies, without destroying their own Grandeur; nor could the King invade their Privileges, having no other Forces than the Vassals of his own Demeasnes to rely upon for his Support in such an Attempt.

I lay no great stress on any other Limitations of those Monarchies; nor do I think any so essential to the Liberties of the People, as that which placed the Sword in the hands of the Subject. But since in our time most Princes of *Europe* are in possession of the Sword, by standing Mercenary Forces kept up in time of Peace, and absolutely depending upon them, I say that all such Governments are changed from Monarchies to Tyrannies. Nor can the Power of granting or refusing Money, tho vested in the Subject, be a sufficient Security for Liberty, where a standing Mercenary

cenary Army is kept up in time of Peace: For he that is arm'd, is always Maſter of the Purſe of him that is unarm'd. And not only that Government is Tyrannical, which is tyrannically exerciſed; but all Governments are Tyrannical, which have not in their Conſtitution a ſufficient Security againſt the Arbitrary Power of the Prince.

I do not deny that theſe limited Monarchies during the greatneſs of the Barons, had ſome Defects: I know few Governments free from them. But after all, there was a Balance that kept thoſe Governments ſteady, and an effectual Proviſion againſt the Encroachments of the Crown. I do leſs pretend that the preſent Governments can be reſtored to the Conſtitution before-mentioned. The following Diſcourſe will ſhow the impoſſibility of it. My Deſign is, firſt of all to explain the Nature of the paſt and preſent Governments of *Europe*, and to diſabuſe thoſe who think them the ſame, becauſe they are called by the ſame Names; and who ignorantly clamour againſt ſuch as would preſerve that Liberty which is yet left.

In order to this, and for a further and clearer Illuſtration of the Matter, I ſhall deduce from their Original the Cauſes, Occaſions, and the Complication of thoſe many unforeſeen Accidents, which falling out much about the ſame time, produced ſo great a Change. And it will at firſt ſight ſeem very ſtrange, when I ſhall name the Reſtoration of Learning, the Invention of Printing, of the Needle and of Gunpowder, as the chief of

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them; things in themſelves ſo excellent, and which, the laſt only excepted, might have proved of infinite Advantage to the World, if their remote Influence upon Government had been obviated by ſutable Remedies. Such odd Conſequences, and of ſuch a different Nature, accompany extraordinary Inventions of any kind.

Conſtantinople being taken by *Mahomet* the Second, in the Year 1453, many Learned Greeks fled over into *Italy*; where the favourable reception they found from the Popes, Princes, and Republicks of that Country, ſoon introduced amongſt the better ſort of Men, the ſtudy of the Greek Tongue, and the Antient Authors in that Language. About the ſame time likewiſe ſome Learned Men began to reſtore the Purity of the Latin Tongue. But that which moſt contributed to the Advancement of all kind of Learning, and eſpecially the ſtudy of the Antients, was the Art of Printing; which was brought to a great degree of Perfection a few Years after. By this means their Books became common, and their Arts generally underſtood and admired. But as Mankind from a natural propenſion to Pleaſure, is always ready to chuſe out of every thing what may moſt gratify their vicious Appetites; ſo the Arts which the Italians firſt applied themſelves to improve, were principally thoſe that had been ſubſervient to the Luxury of the Antients in the moſt corrupt Ages, of which they had many Monuments ſtill remaining. *Italy* was preſently filled with Architects, Painters, and Sculptors; and a prodigious Expence was made in Buildings,

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Pictures and Statues. Thus the Italians began to come off from their frugal and military way of living, and addicted themſelves to the purſuit of refined and expenſive Pleaſures, as much as the Wars of thoſe times would permit. This Infection ſpread it ſelf by degrees into the Neighbouring Nations. But theſe things alone had not been ſufficient to work ſo great a Change in Government, if a preceding Invention, brought into common uſe about that time, had not produced more new and extraordinary Effects than any had ever done before; which probably may have many Conſequences yet unforeſeen, and a farther Influence upon the Manners of Men, as long as the World laſts: I mean, the Invention of the Needle, by the help of which Navigation was greatly improved; a Paſſage opened by Sea to the *Eaſt-Indies*, and a new World diſcovered. By this means the Luxury of *Aſia* and *America* was added to that of the Antients; and all Ages, and all Countries concurred to ſink *Europe* into an Abyſs of Pleaſures; which were rendred the more expenſive by a perpetual Change of the Faſhions in Clothes, Equipage and Furniture of Houſes.

Theſe things brought a total Alteration in the way of living, upon which all Government depends. 'Tis true, Knowledg being mightily increaſed, and a great Curioſity and Nicety in every thing introduced, Men imagined themſelves to be gainers in all Points, by changing from their frugal and military way of living, which I muſt confeſs had ſome mixture of Rudeneſs and Ignorance in it, tho not inſeparable from it. But at

the ſame time they did not conſider the unſpeakable Evils that are altogether inſeparable from an expenſive way of living.

To touch upon all theſe, tho ſlightly, would carry me too far from my Subject; I ſhall therefore content my ſelf to apply what has been ſaid, to the immediate Deſign of this Diſcourſe.

The far greater ſhare of all thoſe Expences fell upon the Barons; for they were the Perſons moſt able to make them, and their Dignity ſeemed to challenge whatever might diſtinguiſh them from other Men, This plunged them on a ſudden into ſo great Debts, that if they did not ſell, or otherwiſe alienate their Lands, they found themſelves at leaſt obliged to turn the military Service their Vaſſals owed them, into Money; partly by way of Rent, and partly by way of Leaſe, or Fine for paiment of their Creditors. And by this means the Vaſſal having his Lands no longer at ſo eaſy a Rate as before, could no more be obliged to military Service, and ſo became a Tenant. Thus the Armies, which in preceding times had been always compoſed of ſuch Men as theſe, ceaſed of courſe, and the Sword fell out of the hands of the Barons. But there being always a neceſſity to provide for the Defence of every Country, Princes were afterwards allowed to raiſe Armies of Volunteers and Mercenaries. And great Sums were given by Diets and Parliaments for their Maintenance, to be levied upon the People grown rich by Trade, and diſpirited for want of Military Exerciſe.

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Such Forces were at firſt only raiſed for preſent Exigencies, and continued no longer on foot than the Occaſions laſted. But Princes ſoon found Pretences to make them perpetual, the chief of which was the gariſoning Frontier Towns and Fortreſſes, the Methods of War being altered to the tedious and chargeable way of Sieges, principally by the Invention of Gunpowder. The Officers and Souldiers of theſe Mercenary Armies depending for their Subſiſtence and Preferment, as immediately upon the Prince, as the former Militia's did upon the Barons, the Power of the Sword was transferred from the Subject to the King, and War grew a conſtant Trade to live by. Nay, many of the Barons themſelves being reduced to Poverty by their expenſive way of living, took Commands in thoſe Mercenary Troops; and being ſtill continued Hereditary Members of Diets, and other Aſſemblies of State, after the loſs of their Vaſſals, whom they formerly repreſented, they were now the readieſt of all others to load the People with heavy Taxes, which were employed to increaſe the Prince's Military Power, by Guards, Armies, and Citadels, beyond Bounds or Remedy.

I am not ignorant that before this Change, Subſidies were often given by Diets, States and Parliaments for maintaining Wars; but theſe were ſmall, and no way ſufficient to ſubſiſt ſuch numerous Armies as thoſe of the Barons Militia.

What I have ſaid hitherto has been always with regard to one or other, and often to moſt Countries in *Europe*. What follows will have a more particular regard to *England*; where, tho the Power of the Barons be ceaſed, yet no mercenary Troops are yet eſtabliſhed. The Reaſon of which is, that *England* had before this great Alteration loſt all her Conqueſts in *France*, the Town of *Calais* only excepted; and that alſo was taken by the French, before the Change was thorowly introduced. So that the Kings of *England* had no Pretence to keep up Standing Forces, either to defend Conqueſts abroad, or to gariſon a Frontier towards *France*, which was their formidable Enemy, ſince the Sea was now become the only Frontier between thoſe two Countries.

Henry the Seventh ſeems to have perceived the Alteration before-mentioned more than any Prince of his time, and obtained ſeveral Laws to favour and facilitate it. But the ſucceeding Princes were altogether improper to ſecond him: For *Henry* the Eighth was an unthinking Prince. The Reigns of *Edward* the Sixth, and Queen *Mary*, were ſhort, and Queen *Elizabeth* loved her People too well to attempt it. King *James* the Firſt was a Stranger, and of no Intereſt abroad. King *Charles* the Firſt did indeed endeavour to make himſelf Abſolute, tho ſomewhat prepoſterouſly; for he attempted to ſeize the Purſe, before he was Maſter of the Sword. But very wiſe Men have been of Opinion, that if he had been poſſeſſed of as numerous Troops as thoſe which were

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afterwards raiſed, and conſtantly kept up by King *Charles* the Second, he might eaſily have ſucceeded in his Enterprize. For we ſee that in thoſe Struggles which the Country Party had with King *Charles* the Second, and in thoſe Endeavours they uſed to bring about that Revolution which was afterwards compaſſed by a Foreign Power, the chief and inſuperable Difficulty they met with, was from thoſe Forces. And tho King *James* the Second had provoked the Nation to the laſt degree, and made his own Game as hard as poſſible, not only by invading our Civil Liberties, but likewiſe by endeavouring to change the Eſtabliſhed Religion for another which the People abhorred, whereby he loſt their Affections, and even thoſe of a great part of his Army; yet notwithſtanding all this Miſmanagement, *England* ſtood in need of a foreign Force to ſave it; and how dangerous a Remedy that is, the Hiſtories of all Ages can witneſs. 'Tis true, this Circumſtance was favourable to the Nation, that a Prince who had married the next Heir to the Crown, was at the Head of our Deliverance; yet did it engage us in a long and expenſive War. And now that we are much impoveriſhed, and by means of our former Riches and preſent Poverty, fallen into all the Corruptions which thoſe great Enemies of Vertue want, and Exceſs of Riches can produce; that there are ſuch Numbers of Mercenary Forces on foot at home and abroad; that the greateſt part of the Officers have no other way to ſubſiſt; that they are commanded by a wiſe

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and active King, who has at his Diſpoſal the formidable Land and Sea Forces of a Neighbouring Nation, the great Rival of our Trade: A King, who by Blood, Relation, other particular Ties, and common Intereſt, has the Houſe of *Auſtria*, moſt of the Princes of *Germany*, and Potentates of the North, for his Friends and Allies; who can, whatever Intereſt he join with, do what he thinks fit in *Europe*: I ſay, if a Mercenary Standing Army be kept up, (the firſt of that kind, except thoſe of the Uſurper *Cromwel* and the late King *James*, that *England* has ſeen for thirteen hundred Years) I deſire to know, where the Security of the Liberties of *England* lies, unleſs in the good Will and Pleaſure of the King: I deſire to know, what real Security can be had againſt a Standing Army of Mercenaries, backed by the Corruption of a Nation, the Tendeney of the way of Living, the Genius of the Age, and the Example of the World.

Having ſhown the Difference between the paſt and preſent Government of *England*, how precarious our Liberties are, and how from having the beſt Security for them we are in hazard of having none at all; 'tis to be hoped that thoſe who are for a Standing Army, and loſing no occaſion of advancing and extending the Prerogative, from a miſtaken Opinion that they eſtabliſh the antient Government of *England*, will ſee what ſort of Patriots they are.

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But we are told, that only Standing Mercenary Forces can defend *England* from the perpetual Standing Armies of *France*. However frivolous this Aſſertion be, as indeed no good Argument can be brought to ſupport it, either from Reaſon or Experience; yet allowing it to be good, what Security can the Nation have, that theſe Standing Forces ſhall not at ſome time or other be made uſe of to ſuppreſs the Liberties of the People, tho not in this King's time, to whom we owe their Preſervation? For I hope there is no Man ſo weak to think, that keeping up the Army for a Year, or for any longer time than the Parliament ſhall have engaged the Publick Faith to make good all Deficiencies of Funds granted for their Maintenance, is not the keeping them up for ever. 'Tis a pitiful ſhift in the Undertakers for a Standing Army, to ſay, We are not for a Standing Army; We are only for an Army from Year to Year, or till the Militia be made uſeful. For *England* cannot be in any hazard from *France*; at leaſt, till that Kingdom, ſo much exhauſted by War and Perſecution, ſhall have a breathing ſpace to recover. Before that time our Militia will be in order; and in the mean time our Fleets. Beſides, no Prince ever ſurrendred ſo great Countries, and ſo many ſtrong Places, I ſhall not ſay, in order to make a new War; but, as theſe Men will have it, to continue the ſame. The French King is old and diſeaſed, and was never willing to hazard much by any

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bold Attempt. If he, or the Dauphin, upon his Deceaſe, may be ſuſpected of any farther Deſign, it muſt be upon the Spaniſh Monarchy, in caſe of the Death of that King. And if it be objected, that we ſhall ſtand in need of an Army, in ſuch a Conjuncture; I anſwer, that our Part in that, or in any other foreign War, will be beſt managed by Sea, as ſhall be ſhown hereafter.

Let us then ſee if Mercenary Armies be not exactly calculated to enſlave a Nation. Which I think may be eaſily proved, if we conſider that ſuch Troops are generally compoſed of Men who make a Trade of War, and having little or no Patrimony, or ſpent what they once had, enter into that Employment in hopes of its Continuance during Life, not at all thinking how to make themſelves capable of any other. By which means heavy and perpetual Taxes muſt be entail'd for ever upon the People for their Subſiſtence; and ſince all their Relations ſtand engaged to ſupport their Intereſt, let all Men judg, if this will not prove a very united and formidable Party in a Nation. But the Undertakers for a Standing Army will ſay; Will you turn ſo many Gentlemen out to ſtarve, who have faithfully ſerved the Government? This Queſtion I allow to be founded upon ſome Reaſon. For it ought to be acknowledged in Juſtice to our Army, that on all Occaſions, and in all Actions, both Officers and Souldiers have done their part. And therefore I think it may be reaſonable,

ſonable, that all Officers and Souldiers of above forty Years, in conſideration of their Unfitneſs to apply themſelves at that Age to any other Employment, ſhould be recommended to the Bounty of the Parliament.

But the Undertakers muſt pardon me if I tell them, That no well-conſtituted Government ever ſuffered any ſuch Men in it, whoſe Intereſt leads them to imbroil the State in War, and are an uſeleſs and inſupportable Burden in time of Peace. *Carthage*, after the firſt Roman War, found how dangerous they were: And *Holland*, in the Year 1672, how uſeleſs to defend them. If ever any Government ſtood in need of ſuch a ſort of Men, 'twas that of antient *Rome*, becauſe they were engaged in perpetual War. The Argument can never be ſo ſtrong in any other Caſe. But the Romans well knowing ſuch Men and Liberty to be incompatible, and yet, being under a neceſſity of having Armies conſtantly on foot, made frequent Changes of the Men that ſerved in them; who, when they had been ſome time in the Army, were permitted to return to their Poſſeſſions, Trades, or other Employments. And to ſhow how true a Judgment that wiſe State made of this Matter, it is ſufficient to obſerve, that thoſe who ſubverted that Government, the greateſt that ever was amongſt Men, found themſelves obliged to continue the ſame Souldiers always in conſtant Pay and Service.

There is another thing which I would not mention if it were not absolutely necessary to my present purpose; and that is, the usual Manners of those who are engaged in Mercenary Armies. I speak now of Officers in other Parts of *Europe*, and not of those in our Army, allowing them to be the best; and if they will have it so, quite different from all others. I will not apply to them any part of what I shall say concerning the rest. They themselves best know how far any thing of that Nature may be applicable to them. I say then, most Princes of *Europe* having put themselves upon the foot of keeping up Forces, rather numerous, than well entertain'd, can give but small Allowance to Officers, whom, notwithstanding, they permit to live in all that Extravagancy which mutual Example and Emulation prompts them to. By which means the Officers become insensibly engaged in numberless Oppressions and Cruelties, the Colonels against the Captains, and the Captains against the inferior Souldiers. So that there is hardly any sort of Men who are less Men of Honour than the Officers of Mercenary Forces: and indeed Honour has now no other Signification amongst them than Courage. Besides, most Men that enter into those Armies, whether Officers or Souldiers, as if they were obliged to show themselves new Creatures, and perfectly regenerate, if before they were modest or sober, immediately turn themselves to all manner of Debauchery and Wickedness,

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committing all kind of Injuſtice and Barbarity againſt poor and defenceleſs People. Now tho the natural Temper of our Men be more juſt and honeſt than that of the French, or of any other People, yet may it not be feared, that ſuch bad Manners may prove contagious? And if ſuch Manners do not fit Men to enſlave a Nation, Devils only muſt do it. On the other hand, if it ſhould happen that the Officers of a Standing Army in *England* ſhould live with greater Regularity and Modeſty than was ever yet ſeen in that ſort of Men, it might very probably fall out, that being quarter'd in all Parts of the Country, they might be returned Members of Parliament for moſt of the Electing Boroughs; and of what Conſequence that would be, I leave all Men to judg. So that whatever be the Conduct of a Mercenary Army, we can never be ſecure as long as any ſuch Force is kept up in *England*; and I confeſs I do not ſee by what Rules of good Policy any Mercenary Forces have been connived at either in *England* or elſewhere. Sure, 'tis allowing the Diſpenſing Power in the moſt eſſential Point of the Conſtitution.

The Subjects formerly had a real Security for their Liberty, by having the Sword in their own hands. That Security, which is the greateſt of all others, is loſt; and not only ſo, but the Sword is put into the Hand of the King by his Power over the Militia. All this is not enough; but we muſt have a Standing Army of Mercenaries, who for the moſt part have no

other way to ſubſiſt, and conſequently are capable to execute any Commands. And yet every Man muſt think his Liberties as ſafe as ever, under pain of being thought diſaffected to the Monarchy. But ſure it muſt not be the antient Limited and Legal Monarchy of *England*, that theſe Gentlemen mean. It muſt be a French Faſhion of Monarchy, where the King has Power to do what he pleaſes, and the People no Security for any thing they poſſeſs. We have quitted our antient Security, and put the Militia into the Power of the King. The only remaining Security we have is, That no Standing Army was ever yet allowed in time of Peace, the Parliament having ſo often and ſo expreſly declared it to be contrary to Law. If a Standing Army be allow'd, what Difference will there be between the Government we ſhall then live under, and any kind of Government under a good Prince? Of which there have been ſome in the moſt deſpotick Tyrannies. If this be a Limited and not an Abſolute Monarchy, then, as there are Conditions, ſo there ought to be Securities on both ſides. The Barons never pretended that their Militia's ſhould be conſtantly on foot, and together in Bodies, in times of Peace. 'Tis evident that would have ſubverted the Conſtitution, and made every one of them a Petty Tyrant. And 'tis as evident, that Standing Forces are the fitteſt Inſtruments to make a Tyrant, tho not of ſo gracious a Prince as we now live under, yet, to be

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ſure, of ſome of his Succeſſors. Whoever is for making the King's Power too great or too little, is an Enemy to the Monarchy. But to give him a Standing Army, puts his Power beyond Controul, and conſequently makes him Abſolute. If the People had any other real Security for their Liberty than that there be no Standing Army in time of Peace, there might be ſome colour to demand it. But if that only remaining Security be taken away from the People, we have deſtroyed the Monarchy.

'Tis pretended, we are in hazard of being invaded by a powerful Enemy; Shall we therefore deſtroy our Conſtitution? What is it then that we would defend? Is it our Perſons, by the Ruine of our Conſtitution? In what then ſhall we be Gainers? In ſaving our Lives by the Loſs of our Liberties? If our Pleaſures and Luxury make us live like Brutes, it ſeems we muſt not pretend to reaſon any better than they. I would fain know, if there be any other way of making a Prince Abſolute, than by allowing him a Standing Army: If by it all Princes have not been made Abſolute; If without it, any. Whether our Enemies ſhall conquer us is uncertain. But whether a Standing Army will enſlave as, neither Reaſon nor Experience will ſuffer us to doubt. 'Tis therefore evident, that no Pretence of Danger from abroad, can be an Argument to keep up a Standing Army, or any Mercenary Forces.

Let us now conſider whether we may not be able to defend our ſelves by a well-regulated Militia againſt any Foreign Force, tho never ſo formidably: that the Nation may be free from the Fears of Invaſion from abroad, as well as from the Danger of Slavery at home.

'Tis well known, that after the Barons had loſt the Military Service of their Vaſſals, Militia's of ſome kind or other were eſtabliſhed in moſt parts of *Europe*. But the Prince having the Power of naming and preferring the Officers of theſe Militia's, they could be no Balance in Government as the former were. And he that will conſider what has been ſaid in this Diſcourſe, will eaſily perceive that the eſſential Quality requiſite to ſuch a Militia, as might fully anſwer the Ends of the former, muſt be that the Officers ſhould be named and preferr'd, as well as they and the Souldiers paid, by the People that ſet them out. So that if Princes look upon the preſent Militia's as not capable of defending a Nation againſt Foreign Armies; the People have little reaſon to entruſt them with the Defence of their Liberties.

'Tis as well known that after the diſſolution of that Antient Militia under the Barons, which made this Nation ſo Great and Glorious, tho, by ſetting up Militia's generally through *Europe*, the Sword came not into the Hands of the Commons; which was the only thing could have continued

tinued the former Balance of Government, but was every where put into the Hands of the King: nevertheleſs ambitious Princes, who aimed at abſolute Power, thinking they could never uſe it effectually to that end, unleſs it were wielded by Mercenaries, and Men that had no other Intereſt in the Common-wealth than their Pay, have ſtill endeavoured by all means to diſcredit Militia's, and render them burdenſome to the People, by never ſuffering them to be upon any Right, or ſo much as tolerable Foot, and all to perſwade the Neceſſity of ſtanding Forces. And indeed they have ſucceeded too well in this Deſign: For the greateſt part of the World has been fool'd into an opinion, That a Militia cannot be made ſerviceable. I ſhall not ſay 'twas only Militia's could conquer the World; and that Princes to have ſucceeded fully in the Deſign before-mentioned, muſt have deſtroyed all the Hiſtory and Memory of Antient Governments, where the Accounts of ſo many excellent Models of Militia are yet extant. I know the Prejudice and Ignorance of the World concerning the Art of War, as it was practiſed by the Antients; tho what remains of that Knowledge in their Writings be ſufficient to give a mean Opinion of the Modern Diſcipline. For this Reaſon I ſhall examine, by what has paſſed of late Years in this Nation, whether Experience have convinced us, that Officers bred in Foreign Wars, be ſo far preferable to others who have been under no other Diſcipline than that of an ordinary

ordinary and ill-regulated Militia; and if the Commonalty of *England* at their firſt entrance upon Service, be not as capable of a reſolute Military Action, as any ſtanding Forces. The Battel of *Naſeby* will fully reſolve this Doubt, which is generally thought to have been the deciding Action of the late Civil War. The Number of Forces was equal on both ſides; nor was there any Advantage in the Ground, or extraordinary Accident that happened during the Fight, which could be of conſiderable importance to either ſide. In the Army of the Parliament, nine only of the Officers had ſerved abroad, and moſt of the Souldiers were Prentices drawn out of *London* but two months before. In the King's Army there was above a thouſand Officers that had ſerved in foreign Parts: Yet were they routed and broken by thoſe new-raiſed Prentices; who were obſerved to be obedient to Command, and brave in Fight; not only in that Action, but on all Occaſions during that active Campagn. The People of this Nation are not a daſtardly Crew, like thoſe born in Miſery under Oppreſſion and Slavery, who muſt have time to rub off that Fear, Cowardice and Stupidity which they bring from home. And tho Officers ſeem to ſtand in more need of Experience than private Souldiers, yet in that Battel it was ſeen, that the Sobriety, and Principle of the Officers on the one ſide, prevailed over the Experience of thoſe on the other.

'Tis

'Tis well known that divers Regiments of our Army lately in *Flanders* have never been once in Action, and not one half of them above thrice, nor any of them five times during the whole War. O, but they have been under Diſcipline, and accuſtomed to obey! And ſo may Men in Militia's. We have had to do with an Enemy, who, tho abounding in Numbers of excellent Officers, yet durſt never fight us without a viſible Advantage. Is that Enemy like to invade us, when he muſt be unavoidably neceſſitated to put all to hazard in ten days, or ſtarve, unleſs we will ſuppoſe we are to have no Fleet at all?

But to come to ſome of the Capital Errors committed by thoſe that eſtabliſhed the Modern Militia's, beſides what has been already mentioned; One of the chief was, the diſcontinuing to exerciſe the whole People, for which there were many excellent and wholſome Laws in this Nation, and almoſt every where elſe. Another Error was, the taking Men without diſtinction, and, for the moſt part, the Scum of the People into that ſmall number which they liſted and exerciſed. Whereas if a ſmall number only was to be exerciſed, no Man of Quality or Riches ought to be excuſed from that Duty. Thus it was, that theſe Militia's fell into contempt; and Men of Quality and Eſtates having Power to ſend any wretched Servant in their place, became themſelves abject and ti-

morous, by being diſuſed to handle Arms, 'Tis well obſerved by a Judicious Author, that 'tis eaſier to exerciſe a greater Number than a leſs; and conſequently all that are able to bear Arms in a Nation, than a ſmall Number pickt out of a wide Country; who muſt march far, and be from home ſeveral days at each Exerciſe. And perhaps it might be found an unneceſſary trouble and burden, to have certain numbers of Men liſted and formed into Bodies in time of Peace, if the whole People were exerciſed, and an eaſy Method laid down, by which ſuch numbers of Men as ſhall be thought convenient, may always be drawn out, even upon the moſt ſudden Occaſion. For by this means the Choice will be greater, as it ought to be, that ſo Trade, Manufactures and Husbandry may be as little diſturbed as poſſible, ſince the Impediments of the ſeveral Conditions of Men are ſo many and ſo various.

'Twill be ſaid, That I inſiſt much upon the Errors of the preſent Militia, and do not propoſe a new Model by which they may be amended. I anſwer, A Parliament only can do that. The People are to tell wherein they are agrieved, and what is amiſs: It belongs only to that Wiſe Council to apply ſutable Remedies: Which cannot be difficult when the Cauſes of the Diſeaſe are diſcovered. And there are many Models of Militia, both Antient and Modern, from which divers uſeful things may be taken.

Of

Of the Fleet I ſhall ſay little, having chiefly undertaken to ſpeak of Militia's and ſtanding Forces. But ſurely *England* cannot juſtly apprehend an Invaſion, if the Fleet alone were in ſuch order as it ought to be. And it can never be the Intereſt of this Nation to take any other ſhare in preſerving the Balance of *Europe*, than what may be performed by our Fleets. By which means our Money will be ſpent amongſt our ſelves, our Trade preſerved to ſupport the Charge of our Navy; our Enemies totally driven out of the Sea, and great numbers of their Forces diverted from oppoſing the Armies of our Allies abroad, to the defence of their own Coaſts.

If this Method had been taken in the late War, I preſume it would have proved, not only more advantagious to us, but alſo more ſerviceable to our Allies than that which was followed. And 'tis in vain to ſay, that at this rate we ſhall have no Allies at all: For the weaker Party on the Continent muſt be contented to accept our Aſſiſtance in the manner we think fit to give it, or inevitably periſh. But if we ſend Mercenary Forces beyond the Seas to join thoſe of our Allies, then, at the end of every War, the preſent ſtruggle will recur, and at one time or other the Nation will be betrayed, and a Standing

Army eſtabliſhed: So that nothing can ſave us from following the Fate of all the other Kingdoms in *Europe*, but putting our Truſt altogether in our Fleets and Militia's, and having no other Forces than theſe. The Sea is the only Empire which can naturally belong to us. Conqueſt is not our Intereſt, much leſs to conſume our People and Treaſure in conquering for others.

To conclude;

If we ſeriouſly conſider the happy Condition of this Nation, who have lived for many Ages under the Bleſſings of Liberty, we cannot but be affected with the moſt tender Compaſſion to think that a Country, whoſe Fields are every where well cultivated and improved by the Induſtry of rich Husbandmen; Her Rivers and Harbours filled with Ships; Her Cities, Towns, and Villages, enrich'd with Manufactures; where Men poſſeſſing vaſt Eſtates, are not hated and abhorred as in other Countries, but deſervedly bleſſed, by the poorer ſort of People; whoſe Merchants live in as great Splendor as the Nobility of other Nations, and whoſe Commonalty not only ſurpaſſes all thoſe of that degree which the World can now boaſt of, but alſo thoſe of all former Ages, in Courage, Honeſty, good Senſe, Induſtry, and Generoſity of Temper; in whoſe very Looks there are ſuch viſible Marks

Marks of a free and liberal Education, which Advantages cannot be imputed to the Climate, or to any other Cauſe, but the Freedom of the Government under which they live: I ſay, it cannot but make the Hearts of all honeſt Men bleed to think, that in their days the Felicity of ſuch a Country muſt come to a Period, if the Parliament do not prevent it, and his Majeſty be not prevailed upon to lay aſide the Thoughts of a Mercenary Army, which tho it may ſeem a Security in his time, yet by being continued, as will inevitably come to paſs, muſt produce, under his Succeſſors, thoſe fatal Conſequences that have always attended ſuch Forces in the other Kingdoms of *Europe*; Violation of Property, Decay of Trade, Oppreſſion of the Country by heavy Taxes and Quarters, the utmoſt Miſery and Slavery of the poorer ſort, the Ruine of the Nobility and Gentry by their Expences in Court and Army, Deceit and Treachery in all Ranks of Men, occaſioned by Want and Neceſſity. Then ſhall we ſee our once happy Commonalty become baſe and abject, by being continually expoſed to the brutal Inſolence of the Souldiers, our Women debauch'd by their Luſt, ugly and naſty through Poverty, and the want of things neceſſary to preſerve their natural Beauty. Then ſhall we ſee that great City, the Pride and Glory not only of our Iſland, but of the World, ſubjected to the exceſſive Impoſitions

Paris

Paris now lies under, and reduced to a Pedling Trade, ſerving only to foment the Luxury of a Court. Then will *England* know what Obligations ſhe has to thoſe who are for Mercenary Armies.

FINIS.